The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Brugioni qualifies as a wise to(p) spokesman for the password-gathering arm of the government in the 1950s and 1960s:

I was one of the original cadre of twelve people who

. . . form the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in the middle to late 1950s. During the Cuban missile crisis, . . . the center became a focal point of many related and diverse activities. I was the drumhead of a unit responsible for providing all-source collateral information to the characterisation interpreters as well as managing collation and processing of perception data. . . . (xi).

The author authoritatively reviews the background of intelligence leading up to the missile crisis, but the problems with his account begin when he whitewashes the aim of intelligence in deceiving President Kennedy as to the chances of success in the U.S.-led verbalise of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. Brugioni utterly fails to acknowledge the well-documented facts of the CIA's effort, through the creation of false data, to force Kennedy into using American war machine planes to bomb Cuba in support of the anti-Castro Cuban forces. He blatantly ignores the fact that Kennedy, enraged over the CIA's deception, forces the resignation of CIA chief Allen dull and top officers Richard Bissell and Charles Cabell. Instead of condemning those three men for their blackened attempts to control foreign policy through l

ies to the President, Brugioni praises them without qualification. He also sees no irony in the fact that Dulles was a member of the group which investigated the possibility at the Bay of Pigs---a disaster created by Dulles and his CIA cronies.

In fact, the Bay of Pigs was largely planned by Eisenhower, Nixon and Dulles, and Kennedy inherited that " whipping" directly from the Republicans. Again, the author ignores the fact that Kennedy would not have bypast ahead with the Bay of Pigs invasion in the first array had the author's beloved CIA under Dulles, Bissell and Cabell not deliberately lied to Kennedy more or less the chances for success in that invasion without American military oxygenate support.

Also, Castro would not have been so willing to allow the Soviet fortify build-up in Cuba (which led to the missile crisis), had the U.S. not invaded Cuba in the first place due to those very Machiavellian maneuverings of the intelligence community.

Buglioni writes of Castro's " compulsive attitude toward President Kennedy and the United States" (61), ignoring the fact that it is precisely arrogant for a leader to feel distrust of a powerful nation which invades his little island as if that powerful state of matter had every right to determine the political structure of his dim nation.

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the subsequent Russian arms buildup in Cuba, Kennedy had little room to criticize the Eisenhower administration or the Republicans for their handling of the "Cuban problem," as he had during the 1960 election (109-110).

In his later praise of the role of the intelligence community for its roleplay on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Buglioni fails to acknowledge the fact that the CIA's arrogant blundering in the Bay of Pigs disaster was in large incision responsible for the creation of that missile crisis in the first place. The Bay of Pigs invasion, and Kennedy's acknowledgement of the U.S. role in that invasion, led Castro to depend more and more on Soviet support, which, in turn, led
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